Public visibilty as a determinant of the rate of corporate charitable donations by Campbell, David J. & Slack, Richard
Public visibility as a determinant of the rate
of corporate charitable donations.
David Campbell
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Richard Slack
Northumbria University
Abstract
The rates of charitable donations against profit before tax were analysed for
the years 1988 to 2002 for two groups of UK FTSE 100 companies. Using a
method based on public recognition of company name, the two groups,
controlled by mean and standard deviation market value by year for size,
were categorised as high and low visibility. It was hypothesised that higher
visibility companies would have a higher overall rate of corporate giving based
on the presumption that charitable involvement and associated giving would
be associated with the higher need to manage a range of social stakeholder
claims concomitant with the higher visibility. The hypothesis was supported at
a statistically significant level of confidence.
The authors are, respectively, lecturer in financial accounting at the University
of Newcastle upon Tyne and principal lecturer in accounting at Northumbria
University. Dr Campbell is the corresponding author (d.j.campbell@ncl.ac.uk).
Contact details
Dr David Campbell
Accounting and Finance
University of Newcastle upon Tyne Business School
Armstrong Building
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 7RU
England
Tel: 00 44 191 222 5395
Email: d.j.campbell@ncl.ac.uk
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Chris Cowton for helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper and to Mike
Cox for helping with the stats.
Public visibility as a determinant of the rate
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Abstract
The rates of charitable donations against profit before tax were analysed for
the years 1988 to 2002 for two groups of UK FTSE 100 companies. Using a
method based on public recognition of company name, the two groups,
controlled by mean and standard deviation market value by year for size,
were categorised as high and low visibility. It was hypothesised that higher
visibility companies would have a higher overall rate of corporate giving based
on the presumption that charitable involvement and associated giving would
be associated with the higher need to manage a range of social stakeholder
claims concomitant with the higher visibility. The hypothesis was supported at
a statistically significant level of confidence.
Introduction
There is a steadily growing literature on corporate community involvement
and a prominent theme within this concerns corporate philanthropy expressed
through voluntary charitable donations. Little is known on the structural factors
that precipitate differential rates of charitable giving (against a measure of
surplus such as profit) and this paper sought to address this lacuna by
capturing the rates of giving for two groups of companies and then analysing
giving rates against the relative public visibilities of companies in the two
groups.
The stakeholder literature has suggested for some time that a firm’s strategic
positioning will affect its exposure to the many claims, legitimate and
otherwise, of internal and external stakeholders (Clarkson 1995). It has been
noted that behaviour assumed to be partly in response to such exposure can
include reporting (Deegan & Rankin 1996; Campbell 2003), types of corporate
social responsibility behaviour and, in recent years, internet disclosures
(Campbell & Beck 2004; Adams & Frost 2004).
The need to ‘manage’ stakeholder claims, therefore, may vary with structural
exposure and a small number of previous studies have attempted to proxy for
this by measuring, for example, a company’s proximity to end user (assuming
this to be a proxy for public exposure – Clarke & Gibson-Sweet 1999;
Campbell et al 2006). Outside the ethics and reporting literatures, models
have been proposed suggesting that public visibility may be an influence on
some corporate behaviours and it is from these that this paper is motivated
(Miles 1987; Erfle & McMillan 1990; Jiang & Bansal 2003).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the
literature on corporate charitable giving is briefly reviewed and this is followed
by a discussion on the importance of exposure and visibility in influencing
corporate behaviour. This underpins the hypothesis, which, in turn, is followed
by a discussion of method and sample. Findings are reported upon and
finally, some conclusions are drawn.
Literature and hypothesis
Previous studies in corporate charitable giving
The literature on charitable donations can be broadly considered to comprise
a subset of the more general literature on corporate social responsibility.
Among those papers that have specifically explored aspects of charitable
donations activity, three main research themes can be identified. These are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: summary of literature on charitable giving.
Type of research Examples
Moral and economic issues raised by
corporate charitable involvement.
Friedman 1970
Nesteruk 1989
Shaw and Post 1993
Moore 1995
Himmelstein 1997
Campbell et al 1999
Pearson 2000
Dean 2001
Porter & Kramer 2002
Corporate issues and associations between
charitable donations and company
characteristics.
Cowton 1987
Wang & Coffey 1992
Adams & Hardwick 1998
Edmondson & Carroll 1999
Williams & Barrett 2000
Brammer & Millington 2003
Saiia et al 2003
Williams 2003
Seifert et al 2003; 2004
Empirical studies - longitudinal and cross
sectional patterns in charitable giving.
Arulampalam & Stoneman 1995
Weeden 1998
Campbell et al 002
Brammer & Millington 2003
Exposure and visibility
Of particular interest to this study is the issue of how public visibility might be
a cause of variability in corporate giving behaviour. There is evidence that
previous research in this area may have conflated size and visibility, perhaps
assuming visibility to be a function of size. Useem (1988: 81) claimed that “the
most important single institutional factor underlying corporate giving decisions
is firm size”. More recently, Seifert et al (2004), for example, suggested that,
“large firms have greater visibility which would attract greater public scrutiny
and a higher standard of corporate citizenship” (ibid, p. 145). Jiang & Bansal
(2003: 1061), similarly, suggested that, “multinationals are more visible [than
domestic firms]” and, “firm size may also enhance the visibility of firm’s tasks”
(ibid. 1061). The assumption appears to have been made (by Seifert et al.
and Jiang & Bansal) that size confers visibility. This was also an underlying
assumption in Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) political costs hypothesis
where the ‘size hypothesis’ was described as being capable of describing
differentials in political and societal exposure. The validity of this assumption
is tested in this study. It sought in part to establish whether differential visibility
exists when size controls are introduced.
Other areas of business research have found some aspects of corporate
behaviour to respond to the differential, specific vulnerability of a company to
certain issues. Reporting studies, for example, have found several such
effects. Campbell (2003), Deegan & Rankin (1996) and Wilmshurst & Frost
(2000), for example, all found environmental disclosure narrative volumes to
respond to the vulnerability of reporting companies to environmental risk.
Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) classified companies into three groups
based upon their proximity to end-users. Differences in social reporting were
observed corresponding to the measure of proximity to end-user. Campbell et
al (2006) found that voluntary narrative concerning community activities was
positively associated with the reporting firm’s public profile.
Inasmuch as both reporting and philanthropy can be considered to be part of
a firm’s broader stakeholder and reputation management effort, this study
attempted to explore whether the cross sectional effects found in reporting
studies was also in evidence in corporate philanthropy. In the case of
philanthropy, corporate behaviour may, it could be hypothesised, respond to
the intensity of stakeholder claims associated with public visibility. Insofar that
philanthropy can be assumed to be concerned in part with stakeholder
management and be associated with company strategy (Saiia et al 2003;
Saiia 2001) those companies most likely to benefit from the management of
stakeholder claims in this way would be expected to make the most use of
philanthropy for such purposes. This is based upon two assumptions.
1. Higher visibility companies will, because of their visibility, have a greater
and perhaps more intense range of ‘societal’ stakeholder concerns to
manage than lower visibility companies.
2. Charitable giving is one way in which this general range of stakeholder
‘societal’ concerns can be, in part, managed. The giving and reporting of
charitable largesse is capable of enhancing corporate reputation among
this group of stakeholders.
Public visibility is, however, a problematic issue for empirical researchers.
Issues raised include defining visibility and problems with its measurement.
Miles (1987) developed the concept of ‘business exposure’, to indicate the
extent to which a firm has “exposure to its social environment” (ibid. p.2). The
main determinant of business exposure, Miles argued, was product mix and
the presence of consumer (i.e. final user in a supply chain) demand. It was
concluded that, “in general, consumer-product companies tend to be more
exposed to the corporate social environment” (ibid. p.3). As the level of
business exposure increases, there is increased pressure on companies to
manage this exposure, and one way of doing so is through the management
of external relations: “The greater the degree of a corporation’s exposure, the
greater will be the need for executive attention and organisational resources
in the area of corporate external affairs” (ibid. p. 275).
Erfle and McMillan (1990) found public visibility to be an influence upon oil
price rise decisions. In that (for oil companies) price rises can be a source of
negative public perception, Erfle & McMillan tested for – and found – that
more “visible firms will moderate price increases in visible market segments”
(ibid. p.128). They concluded that, “visible firms [adopted] differential pricing
to avoid consumer or market share loss” (ibid. p.133). Jiang & Bansal (2003)
found that ‘task visibility’ was important – the visibility of the activities
conducted by an organisation. In the case of the Jiang & Bansal study,
environmental issues were considered and accordingly, activities such as tree
felling conferred visibility.
The belief that philanthropy may be associated with visibility is untested in the
literature notwithstanding a prima facie case existing for such an association.
This paper seeks to redress this deficit.
The hypothesis, rendered directionally, is as follows:
The rate of charitable donations against pre-tax profit will be positively
associated with the giving firm’s public visibility1.
Sample and method
Sample
In order to address the hypothesis it was necessary to generate a sample
capable of being sorted according to public visibility that would also be of
sufficient size to generate statistically significant findings. This was arrived at
in several distinct stages.
It was necessary to control, as far as possible, for all variables other than
visibility. In particular, it was deemed necessary to control for size effects
(Trotman & Bradley 1981; Cowen et al 1987; Belkaoui & Karpik 1989; Adams
et al 1998, Seifert et al 2004). In order to do so, the ‘large’ companies of the
FTSE 100 only were considered as candidates for inclusion.
The FTSE 100 listing was generated by market value at September 2003 and,
using mean annual market value figures from Datastream, the FTSE 100 was
generated for 1990 and 1996 (these representing points near to the beginning
and middle of the period of the longitudinal period). Any companies not
members of the listings on all three dates were excluded from the study
(because contiguous membership was necessary to control for size in the
bifurcated groups – see later). The list of those companies that were members
on all three dates was scrutinised and any that had undergone such change
1 This study tests directionally, i.e. by hypothesising that visibility is a determinant of
donations rate. It is however conceivable that in some situations the rate of donations may be
a partial influence on public visibility. The factors that have been linked with causing visibility
(Miles 1987) do not include charitable donations, however. Insofar that factors such as
product mix, brands and political profile are more likely to be the strongest determinants of
visibility, the unidirectionality of the hypothesis is defensible. Charitable donations in
themselves would be likely to have a marginal effect at most on public visibility.
(e.g. by merger or acquisition) so as to materially affect public visibility over
the time period in question were also excised2. The longitudinal element (15
years) was introduced to increase the confidence in the findings. A shallow
longitudinal element (e.g. one or two years) would not have provided a
sufficiently robust sample upon which to draw conclusions.
The remaining list was then sorted according to visibility. The literature was
unable to offer a great deal of precedence on how to sort companies
according to visibility. Ranking by proximity to end user was theoretically
possible (Clarke & Gibson-Sweet 1999) but problems of vertical integration
may have made this problematic and this apart from issues concerning the
validity of assuming that proximity to end user is a proxy for visibility. Erfle and
McMillan (1990) used Television News Index and Abstracts (TNIA) as a proxy
for visibility within the oil industry – effectively a media ‘hits’ measure.
A more direct approach was preferred that would provide primary data on the
public recognition of company names. This was done by offering the derived
list of companies to 500 British3 individuals with each person being invited to
tick if they had ‘heard of’ that company. The 500 individuals were drawn from
the student populations of two universities in the north of England and from
the administrative staff (i.e. not academic staff that may have biased the
recognition statistics) at one of the universities.
In order to control for the possibility that some companies currently with a high
‘heard of’ frequency may have previously (had the question been asked) had
lower visibility – and vice versa – the sample was bifurcated into ‘high’ and
‘low’ visibility groups. This avoided the pitfalls of attempting to interrogate the
data on a continuum of relative ‘fame’.
Those companies with a recognition rate of greater than 85% of the 500
responses were classified as ‘high visibility’ whilst those with lower that 25%
recognition were classified as ‘low visibility’. These limits were drawn in order
to provide approximately equal sample sizes for high and low visibility – the
recognition distribution was not symmetrical (Table 2)
Companies in the two groups were then analysed for size (mean annual
market value) at the three dates (1990, 1996 and 2003). After the excision of
outliers on both sides that would have skewed the mean and standard
deviation sizes as at the earlier two dates, two groups of seven companies
were finally arrived at. These are shown, along with the summary size
statistics, in Table 2.
2 Whitbread, for example, repositioned itself from a brewer and pub company in the mid
1990s to concentrate more on hotels and leisure. The company name itself became less
prominent as a result and this change disqualified Whitbread from inclusion in the study.
3 British nationals only were included in order to control for the possibility that overseas
students may be less representative of the general British population in their recognition of
the companies listed.
Table 2: high and low visibility groups, recognition statistics, mean annual market values and
annual group means and standard deviations.
Recognition (% of
those asked) at
2003.
Mean annual
market value in
£M
Mean annual
market value in
£M
Low visibility group
(<25% recognition)
Year 1990 Year 1996
Allied Domecq4 24.7 3597 4944
Land Securities 15.9 2524 3380
Reed Elsevier 13.3 2219 6266
Pearson 16.8 1862 3837
Standard Chartered 15.0 1003 6364
Smith & Nephew 23.8 1114 2136
GKN 10.6 950 3481
Mean 17.2 1896 4344
Standard deviation 974 1578
High visibility group
(>85% recognition)
Year 1990 Year 1996
BAe Systems 93.8 1377 4179
Royal Bank of Scotland 96.5 1273 4215
Rolls Royce 98.2 1795 3354
Legal & General 87.6 1857 3679
Cadbury 98.2 2292 5088
Boots 97.3 2838 5819
Granada 93.0 690 6786
Mean 95.0 1732 4732
Standard deviation 705 1232
Method
The relative ‘generosity’ of an individual or firm is measured not in absolute
cash terms but in the rate of giving against the level of surplus enjoyed (the
widow’s mite principle5). In recognising this, the PerCent Club6 defines giving
rate as donations against pre-tax profits. For the purposes of this study, and
to avoid the risks associated with establishing the nature and value of non-
cash (in kind) corporate contributions, cash donations only were used. Pre tax
profit (technically, after interest and before tax – from the profit and loss
statement) is a measure of accounting surplus not directly dependent on the
levels of fiscal pressure in the economy and is thus a fair measure of the
trading surplus of the company in the accounting period.
4 Allied Domecq was formed by the acquisition of Domecq by Allied Lyons in 1994. An
anonymous reviewer pointed out that this may have affected the public recognition of the
company name. The authors accept this limitation but also point out that as it occurred early
on the longitudinal period under analysis, only a few years (five) could be affected by this
limitation. It is unlikely, furthermore, that such a name change would have moved Allied Lyons
from the ‘high’ to ‘low’ visibility group and so the overall distribution of public recognition data
would not be materially affected by the change. The authors thank the reviewer for bringing
this limitation to their attention.
5 A biblical allusion drawn from Mark 12: 41-44 and Luke 21: 1-3. The generosity of a gift is
measured against the wealth of the giver, not in the absolute value of the gift.
6 The Percent Club is a part of Business in the Community – a group of (mainly) corporates
who aim to contribute to charitable causes at the rate of 0.5% of pre tax profits. The
calculation is, however, frustrated by difficulties in the valuation of non-cash (in-kind)
contributions such as product and staff time.
In the UK it has been compulsory since 1968 (the Companies Act introduced
the requirement in 1967) to disclose the cash amount given to charitable
causes in the year under review. Insofar that the profit before tax (PBT) figure
is also available as a compulsory reporting item, both figures could be
established by a simple reading of each company’s annual reports for each
year of the study. The figures were entered onto a spreadsheet for calculation
of the ratio and to facilitate subsequent statistical analysis.
Findings
The statistical problem of giving against losses.
The database generated by the analysis of the donations against profits
contained 210 observations (i.e. 14 companies over 15 years). Of these, all
represented donations against ‘positive’ profits except 15 where a donation
was made despite losses being incurred in the year in question (see Table 3).
Table 3: Companies giving against losses.
Company and year Loss (£M) Giving (£M)
BAe Systems 1991 81 1.31
BAe Systems 1992 1201 0.874
BAe Systems 1993 237 1.349
BAe Systems 2002 616 1.134
Legal and General 2001 149 0.72
Legal and General 2002 106 0.906
Granada 2001 105 1.1
Granada 2002 378 1.1
Rolls Royce 1992 184 0.247
Rolls Royce 1996 28 0.324
Pearson 2001 438 0.748
Pearson 2002 25 0.868
Reed Elsevier 1999 26 0.04
Reed Elsevier 2001 79 0.036
Smith & Nephew 1994 5.5 0.544
Excluding outliers
The presence of these negative ratios frustrated the ability of the research
findings to generate a simple comment on the hypothesis by means of a
longitudinally stacked t-test of ‘high’ and ‘low’ group giving rate observations.
When these 15 observations were excised as effective outliers and the
remaining observations were processed as a t-test, the separation of mean
longitudinal stacked observations (i.e. percentage ratios) was shown to be
significant at the 0.05 confidence level (one tail p=0.003). See Table 4.
Table 4. t-test of longitudinally stacked (i.e. all years) ‘high’ and ‘low’ observations without
negative figures for contemporaneous (year n donations/year n PBT) and lag by one year
(year n donations/year n-1 PBT)7. Negative figures excluded in both high and low groups
Same year Lag by 1 year
High Low High Low
Mean percentage 0.387 0.179 0.43 0.18
Variance 0.506 0.024 0.596 0.022
Observations 95 100 91 94
Hypothesized mean difference 0 0
Df 102 96
t Stat 2.8 3
P (T<=t) one-tail 0.003 0.002
t critical one-tail 1.65 1.66
The difference in giving rates between high and low visibility companies is
also statistically significant when one-year ‘lagged’ data is used. The crude
ratio of means (high/low) for the contemporaneous comparison is 2.1 times
whilst the same ratio for high/low when the lagged data is used is 2.4 times.
This finding may suggest that companies in part base their giving decisions in
any given year by the size of the previous year’s profits.
When company giving against profits was summed for all companies by year
by group (‘high’ and ‘low’ recognition), it was possible to test for the total
giving rates for the group ignoring any company effects that may skew the
sample. Table 5 shows that in each year the high recognition group gave
more than the low recognition group. Figure 1 shows this as a graph.
Table 5: totalled giving rates (as percentages of total donations against totalled profits for the
high and low groups in each year). P value of ‘high’ and ‘low’ separation is significant to three
decimal places (4.3E-05).
Ratio (high) Ratio (low)
88 0.13 0.12
89 0.2 0.15
90 0.3 0.15
91 0.43 0.18
92 0.37 0.15
93 0.28 0.15
94 0.25 0.12
95 0.2 0.13
96 0.14 0.1
97 0.2 0.12
98 0.21 0.09
99 0.2 0.16
2000 0.25 0.13
2001 0.36 0.13
2002 0.31 0.16
Mean 0.26 0.136
7 Research in other areas of accounting and social responsibility research have suggested
that discretionary expenditure in one year might be influenced by the profits earned in the
previous year (Preston & O’Bannon 1997; Moore 2001; Moore & Robson 2002). Dividends,
for example, are believed to be strongly influenced by the previously earned net surplus. In
order to test for this effect, additional analysis was made of the data involving the calculation
of the ratio between the charitable donations in year n by the PBT in year n-1.
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Figure 1. Summed giving rates for all companies in each group by year (i.e. reducing
individual company effects on total).
Range compression to account for negative outliers.
In order to analyse the full data set and account for the fact that 15
observations were negative (thus expressing more ‘generosity’ than a giving
figure against a profit) the data was manipulated to add the maximum loss (of
£1,201 million for BAe in 1992, plus one pound to avoid that observation itself
being represented as infinity) to all denominators (‘high’ and ‘low’ groups, all
years) thereby providing a dataset capable of describing the scale of
generosity in a meaningful manner (i.e. those that gave against losses will
show as higher than those that gave substantially against profit). The purpose
of the recalculation was to reconfigure all values so that those companies that
gave against losses were represented by the highest figures whilst also
showing that those that gave at the highest rates against ‘positive’ profits
were, in turn, represented by higher numbers than those that gave more
parsimoniously.8
A simple comparison of means of the amended figures for high and low
visibility is shown in Table 6. The very high high-to-low differential in 1992 is
caused by the large loss at BAe making the denominator for that company
very high in that year. A cursory inspection of the other differential figures (in
the final column) reveals a pattern: in all years, the mean ‘high visibility’
figures (amended) are at least double those amended figures for the low
visibility group. In most cases, the ‘high’ figure is between 200 and 300% of
8 Suppose than in a sample of three companies, all of whom gave £1 in charitable donations,
Company A made a loss of £3, Company B made a profit of £2 and Company C made a profit
of £3. The order of generosity in this sample is therefore A>B>C although only B and C
reported giving against profits (A made a loss). Let us now add the value of Company A’s loss
(£3) plus £1 to avoid Company A’s amended figure being infinity (for no mathematical reason
other than a value of infinity makes statistical analysis problematic), to all denominators.
Although the ratio of giving between one giver and another is now different (by compression),
the order is preserved thus allowing comparative analysis to be undertaken. A becomes: £1/-
£3 + £4 = £1/£1= 1. B becomes: £1/£2+£4 = £1/£6 = 0.167. C becomes: £1/£3 + £4 = £1/£7 =
0.142.
the ‘low’. Mann Whitney tests produced significance in the single year
comparisons in four of the years analysed (1990, 2000, 2001 and 2002).
Table 6: Mean amended figures for high and low visibility groups with the ratio of high to low
(final column) and Mann Whitney separation statistics. The mean amended figure for the high
visibility group was 2.2 times the mean for the low visibility group.
High Low Mean
high/mean
low (%)
Significance
of
separation
(Mann
Whitney)
88 0.0002035 0.000194 104.9 0.097
89 0.0003311 0.0002397 138.1 0.6
90 0.00051 0.0002424 210.4 0.05
91 0.0005539 0.0002711 204.3 0.12
92 0.125 0.0002746 45519 0.38
93 0.0006106 0.0002872 212.6 0.2
94 0.0004978 0.0002591 192.1 0.2
95 0.0004895 0.0003071 159.4 0.22
96 0.0005519 0.0002707 203.9 0.097
97 0.0006374 0.0002828 225.4 0.097
98 0.0007182 0.0002928 245.3 0.1
99 0.0007923 0.0003346 236.8 0.097
2000 0.0008753 0.0003309 264.5 0.029
2001 0.00116 0.0003749 309.4 0.021
2002 0.0013319 0.0004938 269.7 0.015
Conclusions
The hypothesis is supported at the 0.05 level. The rate of charitable giving
against profit is found to respond positively to public visibility. This study has
found that when size-controlled, the high visibility companies in the sample
gave to charity at a higher rate against trading surplus than the low visibility
companies over the period 1988-2002. This conclusion is made at high levels
of statistical significance using both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric
(Mann Whitney) statistical methods. The differential does not appear to be
related to time period nor is the overall difference driven by a particular part of
the longitudinal period.
The study is therefore able to suggest that it is likely that companies use
charitable donations as one means of responding to their public visibility.
Insofar that visible companies may experience stakeholder claims not
experienced by less visible companies, engagement with charitable causes
and making appropriate supporting cash contributions may be a part of such
claim management.
It is also worth noting that the primary visibility data in this study, controlled for
size by bifurcation, allows a challenge to the view that visibility is conferred by
size alone. All of the companies in the sample were members of the FTSE
100 index as at September 2003 (thereby being ‘large’ companies by most
relative definitions) but whereas some company names were recognised by
almost all participants in the survey, some – of comparable market value -
were recognised by fewer than 10%. Factors such as the presence of a
consumer brand or products bearing the company name are perhaps stronger
predictors of visibility than size alone.
Limitations of this study include its inability to measure the totality of a
business’s donations to charities including non-cash contributions. Previous
studies (Campbell et al 2002) have estimated that cash accounts for
approximately 75% of the total value of donations, however. In order to
invalidate the findings of this paper, there would have to be a disproportionate
reliance on non-cash donations by the low visibility group of companies.
There is no evidence for this.
A number of avenues for further research are suggested by these findings.
Other ‘testable’ issues that may respond to visibility could be examined.
Insofar that charitable donations are one mechanism by which some
stakeholder claims might be managed, other such stakeholder-managing
activities could also be explored. These might include community activities,
political engagement and similar.
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Appendix 1: summary statistics for all companies. Current (same year) ratio of charitable donations to PBT as percentage. Figures
exclude negative figures (hence inconsistent n values) in all cases so these figures tend towards the indicative.
Bae Cadbury Leg
Gen
Boots RBS Granada Rolls Std
Chart
Pearson Reed Land
Sec
Smith&
Nephew
GKN Allied
Dom
Mean 0.41 0.17 0.46 0.47 0.76 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.29 0.15 0.1 0.36 0.15 0.14
Standard error 0.13 0.02 0.23 0.089 0.38 0.053 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.025 0.025
Median 0.27 0.16 0.17 0.36 0.27 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.27 0.1 0.05 0.34 0.1 0.12
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Std deviation 0.43 0.06 0.84 0.36 1.48 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sample var 0.18
0.004 0.71
0.13 2.19 0.036 0.02
3 0.004 0.02 0.06
0.01 0.01
0.01
0.01
Kurtosis 6.9 1.1 11.9 10.75 12.26 3.28 3.1 6.99 2.66 11 1.5 -0.02 2.2 1.05
Skewness 2.5 0.5 3.4 3.07 3.44 1.95 1.6 2.4 1.52 3.2 1.8 1 1.7 0.97
Range 1.49 0.25 3.2 1.49 5.73 0.64 0.55 0.27 0.47 0.9 0.3 0.26 0.3 0.34
Minimum 0.11 0.06 0.023 0.22 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.005 0.04 0.26 0.06 0.01
Maximum 1.6 0.3 3.23 1.7 5.9 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.63 0.92 0.34 0.52 0.38 0.36
Sum 4.56 2.5 5.96 7.5 11.45 2.68 2.7 1.26 3.7 1.96 1.5 5.05 2.23 2.15
Count 11 15 13 15 15 13 13 15 13 13 15 14 15 15
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